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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff-Respo11de11t,

Case No.

12048

-vs.-

.JUDY CAROL LEGGROAN,
Defendant-Appellant.

BHIEF OF APPELLANT

S'l'ATEMENT OF

OF THE CASE

ri111is is a criminal proceeding in which tlH' defrndant,
Carol Leggroan \\·as charged with the crime of murtl1T

in the first degree by information filed in the Third

.Jwlieial District Conrt for Salt Lah

on October

10, l 9G9.

DTNPOSI'I'ION OF

BY LO"'ER COURT

The defendant \ms tried by jury before the honorable
D. Frank

District .Judge, commencing November

2.J., 19()9. On DP<'Prnlwr 3, 19G!l the ease was submitted to

2

the jury which returned a nrdict of guilty of the lPofler
included offense of i1rnrckr in the s<'cond dPgr<'<>. On
cernber 22, 1%9 the defendant was sentPnced and e01mnit.
ted to the Utah State Prison for the inddenuinatP ten 11
as provided for the crime of imH"dPr in tlw
d<·gn•e.

RELIEF SOUOII11 ON APPJ;}AL
The appellant seeks a new trial.

OF F AC1'S
Shortly after midnight on Sepemhr 3, 19G9, tl1e
police, rPsponding to a call placed by the defendant (T63), went to a residence in Hw nortlnYest section of Salt
Lake City and found the defendant's husband lying bleed·
ing on the kitchen floor ( T-22).
was taken to a
pital wlwre he diPd shortly tlwreafkr (T-71). Tlie
of death ·was mnlti ple 22 ealihre gunshot wonn(L ('L'-SG l,
two in the chest and one in the back ( 1 -78).
1

'11 lw d('frnclant was apprelH'nd('d at the sc('ne ('l'-2-1)

where, according to the policP offiec'r, she annomwtd
had "shot the son-of-a-bitrh with his o\\·n gnn." The
offieers ol1sc1·wd that slw was
at times lwr s1wech i rm tiona l ( T-249).
signs of swelling around

hfT

]JOlieP

nps<>t (T-4D) and
Ht-T

face showed

<>ye and mouth (1'-GS) and a

blood aleohol t<>st, administ0n•d after 12

a.m., slio\iTd

3
lilood-alcohol lPYel to he
per cPnt ( T-254, 259),
\rhid1 <·x1wrt opinion Pxtrapolatl·d to 0.227 per cent at
lltl' ti11w leading np to the shooting (T-511 ).

11('1'

"\ polic-P officer who had interrogat<'d the defendant
at the sc<•ne testified that:
[S]he told me that her and her husband had
hPen arguing. She had left the house, and had
waU(ed to North 'l'emple then east to the viaduct.
She stated at this point he owrtook her on foot
and forced her to go hack to the housP with him.
Nhe stated that enroute back to the house he hit
lier twice . . . oncP in the eye and once in the
month .... [A] fter
got to the house the argnmrnt eontinned. ShP stated that among other
things he told her that shP \\·as nothing hut a
whore, and lw also told lwr that lwr mother was a
whore. She stated that at one time she had heen
a prostitnt<•; howeY<'l', hPr mother ne\·er had lwen.
stated that sh0 got \·ery angry wl1en he aceus0d - told her her mother was a prostitute. She
slated that slw rPaclt<•d down nnder the lJed, pieked
up a t,'1m. Sl10 statPd ... "I liad to pnt guts in it''
... land] sh<• ::;too<l np and shot him. She said she
thought sh<• fired abont thn·e shots. (T- 43, +4)
'I'!te officer also testified that shP informed him that
lrnsliand had shot tqi the house the pr<>vions night
<llHl liad
a shot at h<'r (T-3G, G2). (The transcript
on p. "1-L linP 10, is in enor on tl1is point. (Compare T-44
11; t !1 T-:J(i,
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The state introduced e\·idence through the lmshand',
mother and sister and a service station attendant that
the defendant had threate1wd to "kill'' the hnshand on
several occasions in tlw past (T-1()7, 159, 17-1:, 1S7-190).
The defendant testified that her husband had beaten
her severely on numerous occasions resulting in the nece'sity for medical tn•atment, and on one occasion 110spitalization ( T-270-275). Two medical doctors testified in corroboration of her testimony on this point (rr-384-388). She
testified that these heatings had resulted in the loss of
all her teeth on•r a threP year period (T-284-28G).
A number of witnesses, induding the husband's
mother and sister, testified to acts of violence committed
by the husband upon the dt"femlant ('f-1G3, 1G5, 23G, 400,
403, 492). In ad di ti on to the beatings, the defendant testified that her lmshand had threatened to kill her nmrn'rons
times and had discharg<'d a fi reann in her di n•c·tion of
four different occasions, including the
pn·c<'di11g
the day of his death ('11-277-280). This testimony wm;
corroborated by the police officers, who ohservud nmnerous lmllet holl•s at the defondanfs residencP (T-5G, llS123) and an eye witness to one of the ineidPnts.
.
.
The ddendant testified that on the evening of tlll'
homicide tliat she and her husband had quarreled ahont
her refusing to go look at a house lw \rnnted to bn:» (T:29:3). Dnri1;g this argu111Pnt, the
ealled her nn(l

lier motlwr black bitches and \d10n•s hut the argum<·nt

n·as(·cl ,,-]1<>11 U1<•y W<'nt on S<'parnte errands (T-294).
llll\r<'n>r, the argument resmn('d later in the evening and

the defendant att<·mvted to lcavP to spend the night at a
!llofrl. The husband pursued her and overtook her several

Jilocks from their home. He forced her to retnrn home,
aln1sing her verbally and ph)·sically on the way and informing lier that he had "something in the house, bitch,
1rl1<'n yon
to the hons<•'' (rI'-295-2fJG).
'l'Jtp

continu<•d in tlw house, and, when the hus-

band again called the defrndant's mother a whore, the
argtmwnt <>rnpted into a fight (T-29G). '11 he husband then
tl1r<'aten<'d her with the gun and in tlw struggle she got it
awn)- from him and shot him (T-2D7). ShP immediately

ran across tlie stre<•t and railed the police (rl'-297).
Th<> clefrnse lJI'<'s<•nt<·cl the testimony of two psyrhiairists and a JlS.H'l10logist.

The psychiatrists had the

opinion that the defendant, while moderately retarded,
kiww the diffrrence hetwe<'n rigl1t and wrong and ,,·as not

'uhj<·et to irresistihle im1rnlse (T--+24-430, 435). The psywl10 had testNl the dc•frndant extensively, had
tlH· opinion tliat nnd<'r th<· conditions that existPd on tlw
11:1. J1t in qpr•stion tl1e defendant would snstnin severe loss

,lf
1

111

('Oil [ rnl

and lw nncln th• control of cl!lotional irn1rnlses
f1 <' had th(• f mtlier o pin: on that the defendant

a stat<• \\-onld lw m1alJle to differentiate between

riyJt1 and \\'!'Ong (rl'-4GO).

G
At the trial, tlH' tkfrn::-P cl1allPngwl tlw P11tire paiwl
on tlw ground that it was sl'll'ctPcl from the tax assessment
rolls which antomatically PX<'lnd(•d persons who
not
record property holders with the <'ffrct of rt><hwing tliP
number of women, young peoplP, poor peopl<>, and llH'lllhl'l'S of minority groups - all cla:-;sps to which the def(•ndant lwlonged ( 'l'-G, 14, 15). '!'hen' \Y!'l'e only ten womPn on
the panel of fifty prosp<'ctiv<' jnrors called for this case,
of which only eight frll "-ithin th(' first thirty-two stuTiYing the challengPs for em:sP, and all of these WPJ'(' <>lirninated by tlw state's preernptory challengPs (R--U-43). Appar<'ntly then' were no ml'rnlwrs of minority racPs and
the panel was
eornposed of older ]H'ople (T-H).
Defense eonrnwl proffrrnl Pvicl(•11cP as to the method of
jnn- selection ( T-G), bnt instead a stipulation was enterecl
into that the
statutes regarding sdection from
assessrn0nt rolls W<'l'P follo\\-ed ('l'-1-!, 15 ).

POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT

TN

THE

MFRDER .\XD

YOLUNTARY

AND TN" PL\C-

ING THE BURDEN OF PROOF ON DEl:<'EI\D,\XT.
It is readily appan'nt from a reading of the transcript that a conviction of th<' le:,;srr offrm:p of volnntan
manslaughter \\-as a :,;trong possibility in this ens<>. It

7
\\'as undisputed hy tlw state that the homicide took place
during or at ]past irnnwdiatPly following a domestic quarrel which had involwd physical violence. The record is
filled \\rith evidPnce of provocation and pas8ion. Hence
th<' jury \\·as faeed with the problem of determining
\\'hether the provocation and riassion involved in this case
eame with.in the definition of voluntary manslaughter,
and, if they did their duty, they consulted the courts inon this wry critical ]Joint. It is the contention
of appellant that the court's instructions incorrectly
stated the law so as to preclude a finding of voluntary
manslaughter, not only in this case hut under almost any
concPivable fact situation.
'l'he court instructPd the jury that before they could
find the defendant guilty of voluntary manslaughter they
must believe among ot11er things !Jeyond a reasonable
donlit that the killing was without malice and upon a sudden quarrel or in the lwat of passion (Instruction No. 28)
(R-70). 'l'he comt, defined hPat of passion as follows:
The phrasP "in the h<'at of pa:-;sion,'' tu n:-;ecl

m tlws<· instnwtion, 11wans in a state> of mind

known as ang<'l', rage, n•sPntnl<'nt, or an)· other
m<'ntal or <'motional clistnrbane<' of snffieient intP1rnity as to J'Prnler tlw rn;nd in<'apahlf' of cool
n'flPction, and Jll'od11din· of :rneh <·1110tional or
mPntal stat<' as to irresisfolJly rom1wl rm ordinary,
rcasoi1al1fr 1wrson to commit tl1e act clwrqcd . ...
To rPchic(' a ltomiC'id<' from
to yolunt::u)'
wan.-.:Janglttn on th<· ground that it 1Ya.;; ('OIH-

8

mitfrd "in the• JiPat OJ'
i1 lilll:-;t :l)lJll'<li'
that sncli h0at of pa:-;:-;ion 1ra:-; i1HlU<'<'d Ji·-. n 11
adeqnate prnycwation. ,\ml Ii: ··udPq1 air• p;·r1\ocation" is lllPant :-;ucli prnvoc·ation a;; in ilir· o:dinary ex1H'riPnC'<' of rnai:kiJHl ma: lH· J'<•ac;o11ahh
considered snffi<'i<•nt to t•·111poraril.1· rfr·fr;u; a; 1
ordinary pPr:-;on ':-; rea:-;<rn and
1o :'1wl1
an extPnt as to ill<lnc<' him to act under an mH·11ntrollahlc or what llw:· lie ('()m;id<·n·d in 1·i<·11· of
all th<' circmnstane<'s an irn•sistable ptrnsim1 ( lnstruetion rn) (H_ (i3, (jJ) (<·lllphasl:' addPd).
1

In other words, the jury was instructed that they eonld
not reduce the charge to voluntan· rnanslaughtPr nnlP:-:'
they were convineNl, lwyoncl a reasonable doubt, that thP
provocation \Vas :-;o great that. a n•asonahle man'!' mentnl
state would be sueh that he would have hren
compelled to kill. If this wen• the standard, it \rnuld lw
much easier for the defendant to show he \\'as entitll•<l to
an acquittal for rPason of insanity or that the killing \\'il>
justified than it would lw for him to prove h<' 11·as
of voluntary rnanslaug!ttn. l'ndPr th(• dodrin<· of Stal<'
u. Green, 78 1T tah 580, (i P. :2d 177 ( 1D31), a ch•frndant i"
entitled to aeqnittal if 11<'
a
donJi: tlia<
he (not tlw cool reasonahle man) may l1m·e h<·<·n snffNing from a lllPntal dis1·ase,

a t<'mpornry

011e,

11·!iil'h

causC'd an irrPsistih!P impnls<• to kill.
The law of this statP require:-; an aeqnittal if tlwr<' i'
reasonable <louht that tlw killing oecnrPd in a he<t1 of
passion c.ans<'d by tlw rape or dr>fik11H·nt of a {°1•rnale n·i-

9
atiw of th<> killl'r. IG-30-10 r.C.A. (1!)33). Presumably,
this is lw('a11s0 tlH' law
that <>ven a reasonable,
b11· abiding citiz('n might act rashly under sneh circurn:-tmwe>s. I lmYPV<'l", it is r0rtainly doubtful that sueh a
pprson ·would hP i rrr'sist.alJly compelled to kill, since
11·p!']dy parents and husbands manag<' to control th0ir
impnbes and cl10osP to report surh in('idc'nts to the police
rntll<'r than km the iwr:-;on who rommitted the act on
their dauglttur or \\·ifr. Surel!·, a pPrson who killed undrr snd1 ci rcurnstances would he hard put to prove hea rPasonahle doubt that an ordinary reasonable
iwrson would havP heen inPsistahly eornpelled to do the
samP thing. Tlw h·gislature dParl!' did not put such a
tn•111Pnously heavy lmrdPn on the def Pndant in the justifiable homi('ide :-;tatm' and therP is cPrtainl>· no reason to
bP!iPVP that they "·ish(·d to put such a hurdPn on the dPfewlant "·ho rne]'(•ly sePks to rPcluce murder to voluntary
lwranse of prm·okPd heat of passion.
1'1H• pn'.iudieial effPet of thP courts instrnction wa:0

lwiu;hteiwd hy tlw tPstirnon!· of thP ps!·chiatrists that it
douhtfnl that tlH're is such a thing as an irresistahle
impulsP PYPn in 1wrsons \Yho an' seYPl'I!' mentally ill and
that it is irnpossihlP to Jll'OYP or <l;:-;prm·p

(T-+:J:--; J. A
of tlH'

th<' doctors
del'(•Jlst•

ot'

W<'l'<'

an inqmlsP

tc•-sti fying on the

thP jury l'onld not help

hr r<>111irnh•cl that tlw hrn psyehiatrists gaY<' their opin-

i11n that th<' dd'P1Hlant \\'as not acting- nndPr an "inisist-

10
ible impulse" (T- 442, 443), when,
eonside!\'rl
whether they were convinced she "-as acting in the "heat
of passion'' as defined by the court
The origin of tlw language in the court's instrnction
was apparently the holding of the Territorial Supreme
Court in People v. Calton, 5 Utah 4-51, 16 Pac. 902 rev'd
on other grounds, 130 U.S. 83 (1888), approving the following instruction:
To reduce homicidP to tlH' degrpe of manslaughter on the ground sol0ly that it was committed in the heat of pasf;ion, tlw 1wovocation must
have heen consid(•rahlP; in other words, such as
was calculated to give rise to irresistible passion
in tlw mind of a reasonahle rcrson. No slight
or trivial provocation, such as is not calculated to
engender uncontrolled vassion in any ord:narY
man, will snffiee, 5 Utah at 450.
This instruction,
differs in several illlportant aspects from that given in the instant case. First
there is no requirement that the reasonable person be
<'.Ompelled to kill as in the instant instruction. Nor is
there any requirement, as in the instant instruction that
the ordinary person's reason and ;judgment be destroyed
- in fact the Court in that case stated that "it is too
strong to say that the reason of the party should be dethroned ... '"5 Utah at +GO. Finally, in Calton there
no requirement that the jury find beyond a reasonabk
doubt that the killing occurred in a heat of passion - i11

11
fact the Court stated the opposite, that thf' jury must give
the defendant tlw benefit of any reasonable doubt. 5 Utah
at 460. A reading of the entire opinion in Calton clearly
indicates that that Court would certainl)r not have approvPd the extreme instructions given in the instant case.

'1 he appPllant does not for one moment argue that
she is Pntitled to set her o\\rn standard of what is heat of
passion and adequate provocation. However, she was entitled to a correct instruction as to what the standard is.
1

It has bePn held that the Ftah Statue defining voluntary manslaughter is merely declaratory of common law.
Strite v. ColJO, 90 Utah 89, 9G, GO P.2d (193G). WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAvV AND PROCEDURE defines
"adequate provocation" as follows:
Adeqnat<' provocation may consist in anything the natural tcndPncy of which is to produce
passion in ordinary m<'n, and which the jnry are
satisfied did 1n·odnce it in tlw case heforP th<'m,
and does not consist in such a provocation as
must, hy the laws of tlw human mind, produc<'
that physical
such an effrrt "·itlt tlw
effrcts follov\' from
eanses.
(Anderson Pd. 1%7) (Pmpha;.;is added).
Note that the provocation must merely
a tendrncy to arouse passion in the rPasonable man and there
is no reqniremPnt that the rasonablP man he irresistibly
l'ompelled to kill.
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'l'he identical language is used in 40 Arn .Tur 2d
'
Honiicidr, Gl, p.
Am .Jnr also points out that the
sion need not, in fact cannot, exceed \\·hat a reasonable
man can control. 40 Am J ur 2d GO, p. 354. This "·ould
seem reasonable since ordinarily the law does not make
felonies something that a reasonable man cannot control.
Am. J ur. 2d sates:
A frequently approvc'd staterrwnt of the rule
declares that ''reason should, at t lw time of tlw
act, he disturlwd or ohsrur0d
passion to an
extent \\·hich might render
lll<'n, of fair
ayerage disposition, liahl<· to act ra:.;JiJy or \\·ithont
due deliberation or rf'flt'dion, and from passion
ratlwr than .iudgnwnt. Il1irl.
One great source of error in determining what will
reduce an intentional, unlawful killing from murder to
voluntary manslaughter is the confusing of the natun'
of the passion and provocation \\·hich would morally e.rcuse and legally justify a killing with that passion and
provocation which \\·ould negate the presence of malice
aforethought without either excusing or justifying it. It
is only the latter which is involved in voluntary rnanslaugther. The killing is still legally and morally \\Tong:
-

a felony which is severely puished. It approaches the

absurd to say that only a rPasonahle man who, through
no fault of his own, is subjected to irrestible passion may
conunit it.
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'l'he second source of error is the common failure to
reeognize that Uw requirerrnmts "without malice" and "in
tlw lwat of passion" are not ordinary elements in the
sense that, for example, premeditation and malice aforethought are in first degree murder. They are not things
that the state must prove - rather, they are attributes
which distinquish voluntary manslaughter from murder,
and if any party \rnuld wish to show their presence it
1rnuld bP the defendant. The listing of these distinguishing features as "elements" of voluntary manslaughter
which have to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, as
was done in this casP (R-70), shifts the hnrden to the defense and leaves the jury in a quandry. They must be
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that there was malice to convict of murder and they must be equally convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that there was not malicr in order to reduce to voluntary manslaughter. This,
of course, is not the la\\', Peoplr v. Calton, supra, at 460,
and apparentl;' was inadv0rknt on the trial court's part
and unnoticed by c>ounsel. N on0theless, this requirement
that ''heat of passion" he proved beyond a reasonable
doubt coupled with definitions of "heat of passion" and
"adequat<' provocation" which \\'ere so strict as to be
practically impossible to prove at all, absolutely voidPd
any chance of the jur;' reducing the charge to voluntary
manslaughter .
•\ppellant is not unmindful of tlH• fact that defon:w
eo1u1.:::p]

at trial did not cxc·<>pt to tl1<•

\d1icl1

14
are complained of here and, in fact, sulm1ittl•d an instruction that, while not a:;; Pxtreme as the orn• gwen
by tlw court, contairn'd SOlll(' of thP sa11H'
languag('. However, it i:;; clear that this was not the
type of situation where counsel was cleverl)' trying- to
have hi:;; cak<"- and eat it too, since there was no conceivahle gain to the defendant in having snch a strict
:;;tandard placed on "heat of passion." It certainly dM:;
not increase· chances for acquittal on grounds of self
defense, for example, to have PVen the provoked nresi stible angt•r of the n•asonable man so harshly condemned as felonious.
The g1vmg of these erronPons instructions \rm:
clearl>- prejudicial to tlw appellant and if slw were partly
at fault because of her counsel's failure to takP exception,
life imprisonment seems a rather harsh iwnalty for snel1
fault. '1 he state also has an intPrest that a n·nlict in a
1

criminal case he based on corn•ct law dPspih• what the
dei'Pndant may do or fail to do. Sun'ly a defendant conl<l
not "waive" major Plements of a crime defim'd

the

legislature or stipulate to be convicted of a non-existant
cnn1e.
In State v. Cobo,

Utah 89, 60 P.2d 952 (193G).

this Court reversed a conviction heeause of defrctiYP
instructions on voluntary manslaught<>r, despitP d<·frnse
c01msPl's failure to except, stating:

-15
vVe wish not to depart from the rnle laid
down in this jnri;;;diction that in ordinar.'' cases
on appeal e1Tors relating to instructions or refnsing reqrwsts to instruct will not be considered or
reviewed unless
thereto were properly
taken by the party complaining. But in capital
cases and in cases of grave and serious charged
offenses and conviction:-; of long tenns of imprisonment, cases involving
!ife and lilwrt.'' of the
citizen, we think that when palpable Prror is made
to appear on the face of the rerord and to the
manifest prejudice of the accused, the court has
the pov,·er to notice such error and to correct
same, though no fonnal exception was takf'n to
the ruling.
It is submitted that the error committed in the volnntary manslaughter instructions in the instant case is
jnst as palpable and the prejudice just as manifest as
that in Couo.

POINT IT
APPELLANT WAS DENIED A FAIR TRIAL
BY A .TFRY OF

PJIJERS

'l'HE JURY

SELECTION SYSTEM FNFATRLY EXCLFDED A
PORTION OF TITE COilBIFNrl'Y
OF WHICH APPELLANT \VAS A PART.
By excluding from jury serYice all those rwoplP rn
thP eonnnnnit.'· who were not on the as:wssment rolls of

lG
Salt Lake Connty, tlw statutP,
l- tah Code, Ann.,
(1953), exclrnl(•d a snhstantial portion of th(' c011mnmit:-,
the effrct of which wm; to <'X<'lmle a <lisproportio11atP
number of qualifiPd eitiz(•ns who poss<'ss orw or rnorP
of tlw following characteristics: black, yonng, ]>oor, or
female. All of these cah>gori('s of p<:>rsons ar<:> traditionally non-pro1wrty holdPrs,'" as contrasted with
groups of people who arP whit<', older, non-poor, or male\
or those who possess rnon• than onP of thPs<'
tics. These latter categori<:>s of lwople an' traditionally
those who hold most of the pro1wrty. How<>vPr, as will
be shown by tlH' following east's, it is not neel'ssan· to
show the effect of the <>xelusion, it is PllOllgh to shO\r
that thP Pxclusion itself Pxists.
State of Grnrf;ia, 389 U.S. 404, 88 S.l't.
523, 14 L.Ed. 2d 634, the grarnl and l>etit .im>- lists \\·ere
dra\Yn up from the count>· tax dig<·sts, and \\·<·n· li.:::h·d Ji:·
race. N<:>gro<:>s made up 2-1:% of the taxpayers, lmt on!:·
4.71/c of tlH· nam<'s on the grand jury lists arnl
of
tlw petit jury lists. This \\'as said hy tlw Court not to
comport with constitutional standards. This diallvngP
by the defrnclant was suecessfnl lwcaus<> it shom•d an
exclusion from jury serYiCP of a class of citizens. 'J'hl'l'l'
was no showing of the effrd of this Pxdusion, that

In Sims

1'.

*While females appear often as real property holders, there are a
great number of people who are not real. property holders of record
and who would only appear as automobile owners and usually the
automobile is in the name of the male.

17
no slto\\-ing that th<· n•snlt of the trial would luff<'

1H3('11

different liad other gronps hPPn inclmled on tl1e :Jlll'Y
!islO'.
:-.;irnilarl)-, in Arnold v. State of North Caroli11a,
37G F.S. 773, 8-t S.Ct. 1032, a ca::;e dPaling witl1 grand
jnri«s, thP Com·t in a per cnriarn opinion r0venwd a
murder conviction pointing out that the tax records \i-c•n•

ns<'d to get the jury lists, bnt that hlaeks and \\-hites
\H'l"P list('d s(_•parntPI)- on thPse tax records. In twentyfonr years, only one Negro had ]wen on a grand j lll')-,
and th<>rP were 4,800 Negroes in tlw corn1mrnit)· of 17,000.
was said

to

be a prima facie cast> of d<>nial of <'qnal

wotection. Here again, the kPy factor 1rns the showing
that then· was a s)"skmati(' and pm·posd'lll Pxclnsion

and that it was not an «xclnsion
f rnm ('hanf'('. Again, tLere was no req ni remPnt that any effect hP shmYn, it 1rns only 1wcessary to
show that in faet the Negro<'s had hPc•n <':·:elioded.

arnl

th:\ t

An example of a failnn" to prow this
t>xdnsion is Swain v. State of Alal)(t11W, :380 F.S. 202,

:<> H.Ct.

y,·hc>rP tli<' Conrt s:1id tliat '•A state's pm·denial of NPgToPs on account of
oJ' partie:pa-

tion as jurors in t!IP administration of jnst!P<' ,-iolaie;:
tl1e Eqmtl Proteetion ClansP.'' In that cas<·,

of tl10

em111111mity 1n1s hladc, while onl>- 10-lJC;( of the juries in

tht> 11ast fi\'C• >'ears had eontainc'd
:0

'rhP C'onrt

aicl tliat this \\-as not tokr>n iJlclnsion and d;d not amo1mt
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to invidious discrimination under the Fourte0nth Amendment. The Court found no <:>vidence that the jnry eommissioner applied different standards of <1ualification to
the black community than he did to the \vhite couunnnity.
The system was labelled "haphazard" by the Conrt, and
was not found to be purposeful discrimination. In that
case, the racial imbalance was not shown to be purposeful
and systematic, but was possibly the result of chancP,
and so the Court did not find any infirmities in tlw
system.
Two other cases, Whitns v. State of Georgia, 385
U.S. 545, 87 S.Ct. 643, and Jones v. State of Georgia, 389
U.S. 24, 88 SCt 4, illustrate again how this purposeful
discrimination was shmvn, and add a further dimension.
In Whitits, the Court said the burden \Yas on the defendant in a criminal case to prove the existence, of purposeful
discrimination, but once a prima facie case
mad1',
the burden shifted to tht> State. In that case, 27% of
the taxpayers were black, and under 8% of the namet>
on the petit jnry lists were black. The State offerPd no
evidt>nce to explain this, and so the Court held that tlw
Statt> did not rebut the prima facie case of the defendant.
It thus appears that once the purposeful discrimination

and exclusion is shown, the burden shifts to the State to
explain it. Ap1wllant argues that the statute itself,
46-17 Utah Code Ann., (1953), is a purposeful exclusion
and discrimination against a class of persons, that is.
non-property holders, those not appearing on the assess-
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rnrnt roll:s. As llcrna11dcs 1·. /:Nate of Tc.ras, 347 U.S.
-!'/;), 74 S.Ct. (iG7, poinb ont: "'l'lw constitntional command forbidding intentional exdusion is not limited to
:\q!;roes. It applies to any idt>ntifiable group in the
C'Olllllllmity which may be thP subject of lffejudice." 347
r.8. at p. 478 .
. \nothPr examplP of a fai lnre to sustain the hnrden
of pro\'ing syskmatic exclusion, based on other than
raeial grounds, i:s Hoyt v. State of Florida, :1G8 U.S. 57,
S:2 N.Ct. 159, where the Court aff'irn1l'd a second degrP<'
rnurdPr conviction of a woman by an all male jury.
Tl1e defrndant claimed that women would liaye been morP
nnderstanding of lH•r defensP than men. The Court said
that the Fourtt>t>nth AmPndment doPs not Pntitle a dPl'Pndant to a jun· " ... tai !or mad<' to the eircmnstane<•s
ol' tlH· particular case, whether relative to th<> sex or
ot!tN condition of the defendant." But, it also said that
"All that is required is that the
he indiseriminately
d10sen, untrammelled by arbitrary and systematic excl11,,ions."
U.R. at p. 58. It is c!Par that app<'llant has
no right to a "tailor mack"

hnt it is <>qnall>· clear

tliat in appt>llant's case thPre has not heen a .inn· eltosPn
"indiseriminateiy . . . , untrannnelled by . . . sysh•rnatic
Pxdn:,;ion:s,'' as tht> Utah :,;tatutt· itself syst<>matieally
and arbitrarily Pxeludt>:,; a major portion of soeiety.
'l'lH•n• is a eas<' "·hieh has held that the (•xclnsion
from jnr>· lists of a larg<> class of eitiz0ns is n•yprsihle
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tirror. In HJ45, tlw Snpreuw Court decidPd Thiel 1.•
Southern Pacific Co., 323 l'.S. 217, <iG S.Ct.
L.Ed
1181. In that casl', tlw class excluded was "daily wagP
earners'' The Comt said,32S U.S. at p. 22:3: "Wagl'
eanwrs are a substantial portion of the co1111111mity, a
portion that can not be intentionally and sys fr ma tically
excluded in whole or in iiart ,,-ithont doing vioh'nC'e to
the democratic nature of the jury system." Also at p. 220,
it was said that: "Recognition must he given to tlw
fact that those eligible for jury sPrvice are to he fouml
in ev<:>ry stratum of society . . . . •Jury competencl' is an
individual rathPr than a group or class matter. 'l'o
disregard this fact is to open the door to class distinction and discrimination \Yhich an• ahhorn·nt to democratic ideals of trial by jnry." And at p. 22:l, "\Y(•n·
we to sanction an exclusion of this naturP \\'(' \rnuld
encourage whatever desires those re8ponsihle for jmy
selection may have to discriminate against lH'rsons ot
low l'Conomic and social status." It must lw nott>d that
this was a civil action, for lwrsonal injury, hy a
against a railroad, and tlw plaintiff complained that the
verdict against him hdow must h1• rPverst•d
tlw
jury was not made up of a valid cross section of tlw
hut
containPd pro-employPr typPs. Tlir
Court agrPed with plaintiff and n•vnsPd tlw judg1·11wnt
below. It would seem that this principle \\-oulll hold
morP strongly in a criminal mattPr \\-hen· pPnmnal lilwrt:·
is im·olved. Again, it should be noted that plaintiff "·a"
not n•<p1in·d to show the pffect this excln8ion had 011
trial outcome, in fad, the Court said n·v<>rsal was re-

quired whetlwr or not vlaintiff 1rns prejudiced hy the
1rrongful l'xclnsion, or whether or not he was om• of the
exduded class.
'J'his case further solidifies the argument that once
the exclusion of a grouv is shown, the effect of such
need not be shown. In State 1.'. Dodg<', 12 Utah 2d 293,
:JG;J P.2d 798 (19Gl), this court said that the fact that
tlH· jndg<' gave intelligence tests to the jurors \\-as error,
hut not reversible error, and that the judge should stay
1ritliin the statute. But, this conrt also said, that then·
"\\'as no showing that the jnry that tried appellant was
not a fair jury taken from a cross section of the comnnmi t)- in 1\-liidt lw was tried, or that tlw result of appellant's trial would have been diff Prent had the 'quizzes'
not !wen given." 365 P.2d at 800. But, in Dodgf, as in
S1rni11 and Hoyt, supra, tlwre was no showing of the
t•xdusion of a particular elass to begin with, and so this
eomt n•qnired a shm,-ing of the c·ffrct of tl1e jL:dg<:>·:,
adions on dt>fendant's trial outcome, hut when a prima
l'a< i(' cas(' of exc]nr-;ion of a particular elass is made, no
.·;ndt showing is required, as arguPd ahoYe.
'l'he Supreme Court, has, in recent hond e!<>ction
eases, ht>ld that groups of citizens can not he exelnd<'cl
l'rnm tlie franchise. \Vhile these cases do not deal with

.i111·y selPction, they are instructive as to what a Stat<'

can not (lo in tPnns of excluding groups of eitizens from
pnrticipating in f1mctions that affrct their lives.

In
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Kramer v. Union Free School District, 395 U.8. G21, the
Court held that a State can not re:::;trict the vote in a
school di:::;trict election to owners and le:::;sees of real
property and parents of school children because exclusion of other·wise qualified voters was not shown to be
necessary to promote a compelling state interest. While
this case does not deal with jury selection, it can he
persuasively argued that the State has no compelling
interest in not allowing non-property holders, who an•
otherwise qualified to serve as jurors ,to
as jury
members.
In CizJriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701, the Court
held that restricting the franchise to property taxpayers
in an election on revenue bonds violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, because the
non-property holders were effected by the revenue bonds
as much as the property holder:::; were. Likt•wisr, in the
case of jury service, non-property holders are effected by
the makeup of a jury which may try them just as rnnclt
as a property holder i8 so effected.
A similar holding as in Cipriano, supra is City oj

Phoenix v.

J( olodziejski,

38 Law ·week 4597, which lie Id

that the franchise cannot be restricted to 1n·operty
holders in a general obligation bond election,
the difference between the two clas:::;es is not snhstantial
enough to justify excluding the latter, even thongh po 0 sible property holders did have a diffrrrnt interest than
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no11-provert,\· holcl<•rn. Hen• again, as in the case of ,jnry
s<•ll'ction, hoth of these clas::ws would se<•m to
an
id<'ntic-al interest, ancl that ·would be to be tried by a
jury that was a tnw cross section of tlw com1111mity
and th<· rPsnlt of tltis, a fair trial.
Holding the franchise in certain e!Pctions ancl indusion mi the list of veople eligible for jury S<'ITice,
\rhf'tlier these function be considered duti<•s, privileges,
or rights, an· not unrelated activities when the criteria
that rPlates them is that all qualified versons should he
tr('atPd alikP.

In Carter t'. Jury Commission of G(ee1w Cowdy, 90
S.Ct. 518, 24 L.E<l.2d 549, there was a class action by a
group of Negro<>s, alleging racial discrimination in jury
s<'l<•dion. rrhe Court lwld for defendants, and denied
ll1P affirrnativP rdief sought by plaintiffs, bnt the Court
;:aid, ():!: L.Ed.2d, at ii. 557: ''Whether jm.\· :o;ervice ]Je
d<•Prne<l a right, vrivilrg<,, or a dnt:-·, the State ma:-· no
111on• ext,•ncl it to so11w of its eitizens or deny it to otlH•rs

on racial grnunds than it Hta,\" im·idiousl.'· discriminate
in ol'l'1·r'11µ; and withl10lding tlw Pl<'ctiw• franchis0.''
There se<'ms to be no n•ason \d1y in placP of the
word ''racial" in Carter, snpra, thP roric•Ppts of "nonJll"OJH•rt:-- holder" and ''young lJPrson wl10 is a qualifiPd
\Ot(•r'' eonld not he snhstituted, for surely none of thPs<'

lali<'l:-: rnak<' a pPl'l'on irirompdPnt for jury sf•rvirP. BP-
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cause, all that is required in Utah to lw a pC'rson competent to SfTve as a juror in Utah is that one lw a citizen
over 21, be able to read and ·write the English language',
be at least a six-month resident of the county, he a stale
taxpayer, and be of sound mind and discretion, 78-46-S
Utah Code Ann., (1953). It is obvious that a person
can be a non-property holder, or a young person, and still
have all of these qualifications.
Clearly if competent groups of citizens are excluded
from jury service, a truly representative cross-section of
the conununity is not represented on the jury lists, nor
on the juries.

Because the jury was improperly instrncted on the
lesser offense of Voluntary Manslaughter and because
persons who were not property holders of record were
excluded from the jury, the conviction of appellant
should be reversed and the case remanded for new trial.
Respectfully submitted,

JOHN D. O'CONNELL
Attonicy for Appellant

